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of liberty and justice as to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
collateral estoppel can hardly be said to be such a fundamental
principle. "Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that
a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without
[it]."124

DoNAw J. CUMUE

FEDERAL ASSIMILATIVE CRIMES ACT:
HOW MUCH STATE LAW?
The Assimilative Crimes Act, first enacted in 1825 and periodically
re-enacted thereafter,1 supplements the specific criminal laws passed
by Congress for places within the borders of a state but under the
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of the United States; the 1948
Act 2 adopts as federal law the criminal law of the state or territory in
2'Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
14 Stat. 115 (1825), 14 Stat. 13 (x866), 3o Stat. 717 (1898), 35 Stat. 1145 (1909), 48
Stat. 152 (1933), 49 Stat. 394 (1935), 54 Stat. 234 (1940), 62 Stat. 686 (1948). Congress
has employed three methods of adopting the criminal law of the states as federal
criminal law for the federal enclaves. The simplest is the adoption of state laws existing on the date of the enactment, allowing no subsequent changes or repeals of
state law to be effective in the federal enclaves. This method, used from 1866 through
1933, was upheld when challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional power to the states in Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (gio). The acts
in force from 1933 through 1948, and apparently the one in force from 1825 through
1866, adopted the state criminal laws existing at the date of enactment of the federal
statute for such period of time as the state laws remained in force. This method
raises the question of the constitutionality of delegating to the states the power to
repeal federal laws, a question which does not appear to have been litigated. The
present statute adopts the state law in force at the time of the alleged offense, thus
giving effect to all repeals, additions, and amendments enacted by the state legislature, and was upheld in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1957).
262 Stat. 686 (x948), 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952) provides: "Whoever within or upon
any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as provided in
section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission which, although not made
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or
omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or District in
which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force at the time of such act or
omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject to a like punishment." Note
that the Act provides that it is applicable in the "places now existing or hereafter
reserved or acquired as provided in section 7 of this title." Although § 7 defines the
total special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the Act
appears to be applicable principally in the areas defined by § 7(3): "Any lands
reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by
the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall
be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building." However, United States v. Gill, 2o4 F.2d 74o (7 th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
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which a federal enclave is located. In a recent case, Kay v. United
States,3 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction under the Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948 by a federal district
court of a dri'er charged with driving on a federal parkway in Virginia while under the influence of intoxicants. The court held that
the 1948 Act made applicable, first, the Virginia statute which prohibits one from driving a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 4
and, secondly, the Virginia statute which prescribes penalties for the
offense.5 The first statute includes provisions for (a) a chemical analysis
of a blood sample taken at the request of the accused in order to ascertain the extent of intoxication, 6 (b) receipt in evidence of a certificate
U.S. 825 (1953), extended the Act at least to § 7(2): "Any vessel registered, licensed,
or enrolled under the laws of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the
waters of any of the Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them. or upon
the Saint Lawrence River where the same constitutes the International Boundary
Line." The defendant was convicted of the specific federal crime of assault with
intent to commit a felony-sodomy. The assault occurred on Lake Michigan aboard
a vessel licensed under the laws of the United States. Since the felony intended must
be a federal felony, Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 1o (1943), and since there was
no specific federal crime of sodomy, the court found that the state felony of sodomy
was an assimilated federal crime, although, the offense did not occur within a
"place" described in § 7(3).
The areas within § 7(3) are extensive: Williams v. United States, 327 US. 711
(1946) (Indian reservations); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 3og U.S. 94 (1940) (post
offices); Collins v. Yosemite Park g= Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938) (national parks);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937) (locks and dams); United States
v. Unzeuta, 281 US. 138 (193o) (land used for forts and military reservations); McKelvey v. United States, 26o U.S. 353 (1922) (public lands); Capetola v. Barclay White Co.,
139 F.2d 556 (3d Cir. 1943) (navy yards); Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323 (0oth
Cir. 1938) (housing projects); Air Terminal Servs., Inc., v. Rentzel, 81 F. Supp.
611 (E.D. Va. 1949) (airports).
3
Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825

(1958).
'Va. Code Ann. § 18-75 (195o) provides: "No person shall drive or operate any
automobile or other motor vehicle ... while under the influence of alcohol ... or
while under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-administered intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature."
"Wa. Code Ann. § 18-76 (95o).
OVa. Code Ann. § 18-75.1 (Supp. 1958) provides: "In any criminal prosecution
under § 18-75 ... no person shall be required to submit to a determination of the
amount of alcohol in his blood at the time of the alleged offense as shown by a
chemical analysis of his blood, breath, or other bodily substance; however, any
person arrested for a violation of § 18-75 ... shall be entitled to a determination of
the amount of alcohol in his blood at the time of the alleged offense as shown by
a chemical analysis of his blood or breath, provided the request for such determination is made within two hours of his arrest. Any such person shall, at the time of
his arrest, be informed by the arresting authorities of his right to such determination and if he makes such request, the arresting authorities shall render full assistance in obtaining such determination with reasonable promptness.
"Only a physician, nurse, or laboratory technician, shall withdraw blood for
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showing the results of such analysis, 7 and (c) the establishment of
8
certain presumptions arising out of the finding.
Appellant argued on appeal that the vial containing the blood
sample and the certificate showing the results of the analysis were not
properly received in evidence,9 that admission of the certificate into
evidence deprived him of his constitutional right of confrontation by
the purpose of determining the alcohol content therein. The blood sample shall
be placed in a sealed container provided by the Chief Medical Examiner. Upon
completion of taking of the sample, the container must be resealed in the presence
of the accused after calling the fact to his attention. The container shall be especially equipped with a sealing device, sealed so as not to allow tampering, labeled
and identified showing the person making the test, the name of the accused, the
date and time of taking. The sample shall be delivered to the police officer for
transporting or mailing to the Chief Medical Examiner. Upon receipt of the blood
sample, the office of the Chief Medical Examiner shall examine it for alcoholic
content. That office shall execute a certificate which certificate shall indicate the
name of the accused, the date, time and by whom the same was received and examined, and a statement that the container seal had not been broken or otherwise
tampered with and a statement of the alcoholic content of the sample.
"Other than as expressly provided herein, the provisions of this section shall
not otherwise limit the introduction of any competent evidence bearing upon any
question at issue before the court. The failure of the accused to request such a
determination is not evidence and shall not be subject to comment in the trial of the
case."
Forty-seven states use chemical tests, including blood tests, to aid in the detemination of intoxication in cases involving charges of driving while under the
influence of alcohol. Twenty-three of these states sanction the use of the tests
by statute. For an enumeration of the state statutes, see Briethaupt v. Abram, 552
U.S. 432, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448, 451 at n. 3 (1957)Wa. Code Ann. § 18-75.2 (Supp. 1958) provides for a report of the blood test
and, upon proper identification of the container, for a certificate being admitted
as evidence of the results of the analysis.
sVa. Code Ann. § 18-75. 3 (Supp. 1958) sets up the following presumptions based
on the result of the blood analysis: "(i) If there was ...0.05 per cent or less by
weight of alcohol in the accused's blood, it shall be presumed that the accused
was not under the influence of alcoholic intoxicants; (2)If there was... in excess
of o.o5 per cent but less than o.15 per cent by weight ...such facts shall not give
rise to any presumption that the accused was or was not under the influence of
alcoholic intoxicants, but such facts may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused; (3)If there was... o.15
per cent or more by weight of alcohol in the accused's blood, it shall be presumed
that the accused was under the influence of alcoholic intoxicants." These presumptions are similar to those in § 11-9o2 of the Uniform Vehicle Code prepared
by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances.
9
The facts used to substantiate this contention were (i) that there was no identification of the person who took the blood, thus no evidence that § 18-75.1 was
complied with; (2)that appellant's arm was wiped off with-alcohol through which
the needle was inserted, which could have increased the alcoholic content; and (3)
that a white substance was seen in the vial, which was assumed to be an anticoagulate, but which was not identified. 255 F.2d at 480.
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witnesses,1 0 and that the presumptions created deprived him of due
process." The court held, however, that since no question was raised
below as to the proper identification of the vial and the certificate,
receipt in evidence was properly made and that in a federal court
the certificate would have been admissible in any event under the provisions of another federal statute.12 Receipt in evidence of the certificate did not foreclose inquiry into the regularity of the procedure,
but it was held that any inquiry would go to the weight of the evidence
rather than to its admissibility. 13 Nor did the court find that admission of the certificate deprived appellant of his constitutional right of
confrontation by "witnesses.14 On the question of due process, the
"Id. at 48o-81. Appellant argued that § 18-75,2 was unconstitutional as unduly
precluding inquiry into the accurateness of the Medical Examiner's report, since
"proper identification" of the vial was the only requirement for admitting the
certificate into evidence. See note 7 supra. It was contended that since admission
into evidence was not based on requirements otheF than identification of the vial,
the details outlined in § 18-75.1 were rendered immaterial. Brief for Appellant, pp.
17-18 (on appeal), Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958); 33rief for
Appellant, pp. 10-14 (petition for certiorari), Kay v. United States, supra.
11255 F.2d at 481. The contention in this regard was that by allowing the presumption to be weighed against the evidence of appellant, the statute gives the
presumption the effect of evidence and in so doing contravenes the due process
clauses of the United States and Virginia Constitutions. Brief for Appellant, pp.
18-23 (on appeal), Kay v. United States, supra. In petition for certiorari, appellant
also claimed that since petitioner did not request the blood analysis, as specified
in § 18-75.1, supra note 6, its introduction as evidence constituted illegal search of
his person and self-incrimination in contravention of the fourth and fifth
amendments of the United States Constitution. Brief for Appellant, pp. 5-1o (petition for certiorari), Kay v. United States, supra.
1255 F.2d at 480. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1952) provides for admission in evidence,
pursuant to statutory requirement, of writings made in the regular performance
of the official duties of a public official.
2255 F.2d at 48o. The courts of Virginia, in interpreting the regularity of this
procedure, have used the following test: Was the evidence identifying the blood
sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the blood analyzed was that
extracted from the accused? If not, a motion to exclude the findings will be sus.tained. Newton v. City of Richmond, 198 Va. 869, 96 S.E.2d 775 (1957); Rodgers v.
CommonweMth, 197 Va. 527, 90 S.E.2d 257 (1955). See also, Novak v. District of
Coiumbia, i6o F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Greenwood v. United States, 97 F. Supp.
996 (D. Ky. 1951). These Virginia and federal decisions have strongly insisted that
there be no missing link in the chain of identification. Since the substance to
be analyzed must pass through several hands, the evidence, to be admissible,
cannot leave to conjecture who had the sample and what was done with it between
the taking and the analysis. See McGowan v. Los Angeles, ioo Cal. App. 2d 386,
223 P.2d 862 (ig5o); Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 493, 178 P.2d 40 (1947); Brown v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 144, 240 S.W.2d
31o (ig5i). See also, State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d. 757 (1947). For a thorough
discussion of the evidence aspects of the problem see, Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1952).
u255 F.2d at 48o-81. The authorities show that when there is statutory authority
for making a certificate by a public officer of acts which are within the scope of his
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court reasoned that since a rebuttable presumption "neither restricts
the defendant in the presentation of his defense nor deprives him
of the presumption of innocence,"' 5 there was no constitutional
objection to the jury's consideration of the statutory presumption
together with all of the other evidence.16
The briefs of both parties before the appellate court and on
petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court centered
exclusively around the questions of the admissibility of the evidence,
the reasonableness of the statutory presumptions, and the constitutional issues of confrontation and due process. 17 The more fundamental
problem of whether the entire Virginia statutory provision prohibiting
drunken driving, prescribing a standard by which drunkenness can
be measured, and establishing certain presumptions based on such
finding is incorporated into federal law by the Assimilative Crimes
Act of 1948 was not discussed. Potentially, every case under the Act
presents the question of how much state law is assimilatedinto federal
law. For example, it is possible that all of the substantive state law
is incorporated, but that the procedural aspects of the state law are not
assimilated. If a distinction between substance and procedure be
duty as an officer, such certificate is normally receivable under the documentary
evidence rule as an exception to the hearsay rule. For a general discussion see, Annot.,
29 A.L.R. 289 (1924). The constitutional right of an accused to confrontation may
not be invoked to exclude evidence otherwise admissible under well-established
exceptions to the hearsay rule. Matthews v. United States, 217 F.2d 4o9 (5th Cir.
1954); United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 5o7 (2d Cir. 1943). See also, Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Cf., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1933), arising
under the fourteenth amendment and suggesting that the exceptions are not
static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from
the reason of the general rule. The constitutional guaranty of confrontation carries
with it the exceptions to the common law principle which it embodies. Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 32o, 175 N.E. 718 (ig3i). See also, Salinger v. United States,
272 U.S. 542 (1926); People v. Reese, 258 N.Y. 89, 179 N.E. 305 (1932). Certificates
quite comparable to the one in the principal case have been held admissible over
objections upon similar constitutional grounds. State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 131
At. 429 (1925); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 14o N.E. 465 (1923); Bracey
v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916). But cf. Estes v. State, 283 S.W.2d
52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955).
15255 F.2d at 481. On the broad general question of the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance making one fact presumptive evidence of another fact, see,
Annot., 51 A.LR. 1139 (1927); Annot., 86 A.L.R. 179 (1933); Annot., 162 A.L.R.
495 (1946). See also, Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Western & Ad. R.R. v.
Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925); Hawes
v. Georgia, 258 U.S. x (1922); Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turipseed, 210 US. 35
(gio); State v. Childress, 78 Ariz. 1,. 274 P.2d 333 (1954), 46 A.L.R.2d 1176 (1956);
Toms v. State, 239 P.2d 812 (Okla. Crim. 1952); Burnette v. Commonwealth,
Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953)10255 F.2d at 48t.
'See notes 9-11 supra.
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meaningful in construing the Assimilative Crimes Act-and it would
be in civil cases in federal courts based on diversity of citizenshipit is significant to inquire into the basis for such a distinction and
how it would be drawn.
The Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948 specifically provides for
the punishment of any act or omission punishable within the jurisdiction of the State.18 In interpreting this language under prior Assimilative Crimes Acts, the courts have held that Congress may
validly incorporate state laws into federal penal statutes, 19 and that
an act may be criminal under both state and federal law. 20 Moreover,
the Act applies to'state statutes enacted after the effective date of the
1948 Act, as well as to those in force prior to that date. 21 The only
patent exception to assimilation of a state criminal statute is the provision that if Congress had itself made certain conduct criminal the
22
Act does not apply.
23See note 2 supra.
"Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
8oi (1947), rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 821 (1947).
nSee WVestfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 at 258 (1927).
mnUnited States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1957) upheld the constitutionality
of the 1948 Act insofar as it makes applicable to a federal enclave a subsequently enacted criminal law of the state in which the enclave is situated. The Act was held
not to be an unconstitutional delegation to the states of Congressional legislative authority, but rather a deliberate and continuing adoption by Congress of such
unpre-empted offenses and punishments as already put into effect by the respective
states. Id. at 294. Black and Douglas, JJ., dissented on the ground that the Act
is in conflict with the principle that Congress alone has the power to make rules
governing federal enclaves. Id. at 297.
2See note i supra. Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946). It may be
difficult to determine whether the Congressional definition of a criminal offense
necessarily precludes assimilation of the state law-e.g., in order to secure a conviction, a federally defined crime may require a showing of intent, although the
comparable state crime does not; in this situation it would appear that Congress
has deemed intent an essential element and that the state law should not be adopted.
A different result, however, seems proper when a state statute allows prosecution
Tor an attempted crime, but where the attempt is not covered by a federal statutee.g., the federal crimes-of robbery, 18 US.C. § 211 (1952), and larceny, 18 U.S.C. §
661 (1952), do not appear to include attempts, but only completed crimes. Moreover,
there is no general attempt section in the Federal Criminal Code. But see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 31(c). The same problems may arise where the crime to be assimilated
is closely related to the specific federal crime-e.g., larceny is a federally defined
crime within the enclaves, but burglary is not. 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1952). In view of
the fact that there may be a burglary without a completed larceny, the creation
of the federal crime of larceny should not be viewed as precluding the assimilation
of the state offense of burglary. However, a completed larceny which included a
burglary raises difficult questions. Although it may be argued that only the larceny
can be prosecuted, it has been held that burglary and larceny are different crimes,
and punishment for each is permitted. Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Dunaway v. United States, 17o F.2d 1t (ioth Cir. 1948). See also, Kirchheimer, The Act,
The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 519 (1949)-
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Nevertheless, limitations to incorporation have been made by judicial decision. Two cases involving a Virginia segregation law23 have
held that the Assimilative Crimes Act should not be construed to
adopt a state law inconsistent with a policy of Congress as expressed
in a civil statute, 24 or in a regulation issued pursuant to statutory
authority. 25 Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 26 in granting equitable relief from state seizure of a shipment of liquor destined for an
army post in Oklahoma, indicated that federal courts are not bound
by rulings of a state court regarding the statute in question, even
though some part of the question involved a consideration of state
law adopted by the federal government. The Johnson holding27 tacitly
contradicts United States v. Andem, 28 the only prior decision on the
issue of whether a state court's interpretation of an assimilated statute
is controlling.
In the Andem case a federal district court followed the state court's
interpretation of a state statute, expressly holding it to be binding on
federal courts. In that case an employee in a United States Post Office
located in New Jersey was indicted under a New Jersey forgery statute
for forging and counterfeiting the seal of a private corporation. The
court held that by virtue of the earlier Assimilative Crimes Act of 1898
the federal government had jurisdiction to prosecute for an act which
violates state law and which was committed in a building over which
legislative jurisdiction has been ceded to the federal government. 29
2'Va. Code Ann. §§ 18-327, 328 (195o).
"4Air Terminal Servs., Inc. v. Rentzel, 81 F. Supp. 6Oi (E.D. Va. 1949).
3Nash v. Air Terminal Servs., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949). The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics had not exercised his statutory power to issue
regulations forbidding segregation at the Washington National Airport, a federal
enclave located in Virginia. The court regarded its result of adopting the Virginia
segregation statute, note 23 supra, as consistent with its earlier decision in the
Rentzel case, note 24 supra, holding that when regulations to forbid segregation
on the federal enclave were issued by the Administrator, assimilation of the state
segregation laws was precluded. The Rentzel opinion, however, had relied upon the
regulation as only a part of a general federal policy, and it would seem that this
general policy could have been found sufficient to bar assimilation in Nash v. Air
Terminal Servs., Inc., supra.
"321 U.S. 383 (194).
"Id. at 391.

1 58 Fed. 996 (D.N.J. 19o8).

"It was argued that the word "character" was inadvertently substituted for the
word "charter" in the New Jersey criminal forgery statute, which was adopted
by the Assimilative Crimes Act. The courts of New Jersey had established the rule
that an engrossed act of the legislature, duly approved, signed, and filed, was conclusive evidence of its contents and could not be contradicted by any evidence
whatsoever. The federal district court, in view of such state interpretation, refused
to consider the word "character" as meaning "charter," and held that the seal
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Although Johnson can be distinguished from Kay and Andem on
the ground that applicability of the Assimilative Crimes Act was not decided, dictum ,in Johnson pointed up the fundamental question of
which, if any, of the state penal statutes "are so designed that they
could be adopted by the assimilative crimes statute." 30 Language used
in three prior decisions gives an insight into the Supreme Court's interpretation of how much state law is assimilated by the Act. In Puerto
Rico v. Shell Co.,31 the court, in comparing the Assimilative Crimes Act
to another federal statute which the case involved, 32 emphasized that
details of the federal law as assimilated, "instead of being recited,
are adopted by reference." 33 Moreover, in United States v. Press Publishing Co.,3 4 the court held that the punishment in the federal courts
for an offense committed on a government reservation can be "only
in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if
the territory embraced by such reservation had remained subject to
the jurisdiction of the state." 35 Based on this reasoning, circulation
on federal enclaves of a newspaper containing a criminal libel printed
and primarily published in New York City was not held punishable
in the federal courts under the Act, since conviction would be "disregarding the laws of that State and frustrating the plain purpose of
such law, which was that there should be but a single prosecution
and conviction." 30 Thus the court was guided by state interpretation
of the New York statute in holding that the Assimilative Crimes
Act did not apply at all, and a quashing of the conviction was affirmed.
United States v. Coppersmith,37 involving the number of peremptory
challenges allowed in a federal prosecution for counterfeiting, said in
dictum that when state laws are adopted by the Assimilative Crimes
Act, "they stand as if the act of
Congress had defined the offenses in the
38 s
very words of the state law."
In the Andem case the federal court, after holding state interpre.tation of the adopted statute binding on federal courts, incorporated
the substiantive state offense and excluded the procedural aspects;
of a corporation must be regarded as a "character" within the meaning of the
adopted act. Id. at 998-99.
10321 U.S. at 389.
2'302 U-S. 253 (1937).
"2a6 Stat. 29o (x89o) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
"3o2 U.S. at 266.
"219 U.S. 1 (1911).

3Id. at o.
6Id. at 15.
'14 Fed. 198 (W.D. Tenn. i88o).
211d. at 2o5.
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there, the court upheld application of the federal statute of limitations over the state statute of limitations, principally on the ground
that the state statute of limitations was embodied in a different statute
from that which defined the assimilated offense.3 9 This brings into
focus the signficance of the substantive-procedural distinction in such
cases, for had the statute of limitations been included in the same
statute or section that defined the crime, it would probably have been
construed as applicable to the right itself, rather than to the remedy;
accordingly, in such a case, the statute of limitations would be re40
garded as substantive.
Although Andem is the only case prior to Kay involving the
Assimilative Crimes Act that draws such a distinction as a basis for
not adopting a state statute which relates to the remedy but not to
the elements of the offense in question, the Kay decision concluded
that the presumptions embodied in the Virginia statute proscribing
drunken driving are not merely procedural, for they amount to a
redefinition of the offense and that as a new defintion of the
substantive offense are adopted by the Assimilative Crimes Act of
1948.41 Although presumptions, except for conclusive presumptions,
are almost unanimously regarded as matters of procedure, 42 the
court's language in Kay is generally in accord with the conflict of laws
principle that the court of the forum determines, in accordance with
its own conflict of laws principles, whether the question involved is
one of substance or procedure. 43 Thus, in view of the language in
the Johnson, Puerto Rico and Press Publishing Co. cases and because
the Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948 specifically provides that an act
will be federally punishable "if it would be punishable if committed ... within the jurisdiction of the State,"44 a conflict of laws analogy
seems appropriate in cases involving the Act.
It therefore appears that in a case involving the Assimilative Crimes
Act the federal court must first determine how much of the state
law is adopted by the Act. It further appears that the distinction between substantive law and procedure is a determinant in reaching
m158 Fed. at xooo.
4OGoodrich, Conflict of Laws 243 (3d ed. 1949).
"1255 F.2d at 479-8o.
2Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 192 (1944);
Goodrich, op. cit. supra at 237.
"3Goodrich, op. cit. supra at 228. Cf., Morgan, op. cit. supra at 194: "That
presumptions are properly classified asprocedural is beside the point. The desirability of securing identity of result in whatever forum the controversy is tried ought to
be controlling...."
"See note i supra.
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such a decision and that the federal court itself will decide the sub45
stantive-procedural issue rather than look to state interpretation.
The court's language in Kay was emphatic on this latter point, although the court did rely on Virginia judicial construction of the
statute in question: "Indeed state interpretation of the adopted statutes
is not binding upon a federal court, and federal, rather than state,
rules of evidence are applicable to all prosecutions under the Act." 46
41
On this point, the court in Kay refers to similar language in Johnson.
No reference was made in Kay to a contrary holding in Andem;
the fact that Anden was decided by a district court in another federal
circuit and that Johnson was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court may
48
be significant in this respect.
The language in Kay that a federal court is not bound by state
interpretation may be construed as a reservation of the right not
to be so bound, but not as a denial of the federal court's privilege
to look to state construction when such is deemed by the court as
appropriate. It might seem that since the Assimilative Crimes Act
provides that an act will be federally punishable if it would be punishable if committed within the jurisdiction of the state, Congress intended to adopt not only the state criminal statutes, but also the state
courts' interpretations of those statutes. The Press Publishing Co. case
turned on the point that the state court's interpretation was controlling; 49 that case was not cited by the Kay court, although it was
a Supreme Court decision. Thus Johnson and Kay appear to pull the
teeth of Andem and Press Publishing Co. on the question of state
interpretation of a statute adopted by the Act.
Several conclusions can be reached in view of the Kay decision
regarding the problems of the extent of state law adopted by the
Assimilative Crimes Act and of the criteria for determining such. In
the first place, the federal court has reserved the right to interpret
a state statute rather than to look solely to state construction. In this regard, it can be reasonably assumed that Congressional intent in enacting a statute specifically adopting state crimes as federal offenses
will be considered by a federal court and that implementation of
such intent will be a factor in whether the court relies partially or
totally on state interpretation or whether it disregards state interpre' See Sampson v. Channell, xo F.2d 754 (ist Cir. 194o), cert. denied, 3io U.S. 650

(1940).
"255 F.2d at 479.
" See text accompanying note 26 supra.
"8See notes 26-27 supra.
"See notes 33-34 supra.

